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edge; and on these considerations which are summarized and repeated in the cable, we came to the conclusion that we should accede to the sugges- tion of the United Kingdom authorities.
Q. And that was the basis of the decision made, was it?-A. That y a large element, I think; a large element in prompting us to come to decision; that, and the desire to be of help to the common cause wherever we felt we could be of help.
The Canadian Government, having no sources of its own of military information in the Far East, naturally and necessarily relied upon the Govern- ment of the United Kingdom for advice as to the military and diplomatic situation there. In September and October, 1941, it was the accepted view, both in England and in Canada, that war with Japan was not imminent, although it was recognized that, to use the words of Major Power, "if war broke out with Japan the Canadian forces in Hong Kong would be in a very difficult position.'
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Mr. Drew urged that from the report of Mr. Justice Roberts touching the occurrences at Pearl Harbour, it is evident the American Government in October had in its possession information pointing unequivocally to an early outbreak of hostilities with Japan, and he argued that such information ought to have been in the possession of the Canadian Government. The evidence establishes in point of fact that the Canadian Government had no such information. I repeat that the Canadian Government relied and necessarily relied upon the British Government for confidential information as to the military situation in the Far East.
General Crerar says:-
Information at my disposal during latter part of September, 1941, indicated that outbreak of hostilities with Japan was not imminent and that time would, in all probability, be available to carry out intensive, adequate and possibly extensive training of Canadian forces at Hong Kong after their arrival.
General Stuart (now Chief of the General Staff) says:-
"Q. And you say that is quite a different situation than existed in September and October?-A. That was an entirely different situation. It must be remembered that at the time of the inception of this force we were at peace with Japan; we had no information from London, official informa- tion, or from any other source to the effect that war with Japan was imminent. In fact, we had been explicitly informed that the situation had improved.
Q. Did you keep in touch with the situation from September 19 until the despatch of the force, I mean the Hong Kong situation and the Pacific situation?--A. Yes, and there were no wires received by us during that period from the United Kingdom that indicated any change in the situa- tion. The last wire got before the force sailed was on October 26. The telegram of October 26 mentioned by General Stuart contains the following:-"Consensus opinion that war in Far East unlikely at present."
There were, moreover, solid military grounds for a conclusion that even in the event of hostilities the situation of the expeditionary force would not be a hopeless one. The discussion of the military situation at Hong Kong between General Crerar and General Grasett in the late summer of 1941 has already been mentioned. In the third week of September the information thus gained by General Crerar as to the actual military situation in Hong Kong was, excepting the information conveyed in the telegram of September 19, the latest and most authoritative information on that subject available. It was
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confidently expected that, in the event of war, the British Commonwealth would have both the United States and China as active allies. The American Pacific fleet was concentrated at Honolulu and British naval forces in the Far East had recently been strengthened by the addition of the battleships the "Prince Wales" and the "Repulse". Japanese forces operating along the Chinese coast adjacent to Hong Kong were constantly harassed by Chinese troops. In the event of a Japanese attack on Hong Kong it was considered reasonable to expect that the garrison could be relieved or evacuated from the sea by use of combined British and American naval forces. It was also not unreasonable to expect some assistance from the landward side by the Chinese forces. A telegram from Canadian military headquarters in London, dated October 26, 1941, stated that the Chinese Government had undertaken to attack the Japanese in the rear of Canton if the Japanese attacked Hong Kong, and were prepared to use ten divisions for this effort. Canadian troops would not, therefore, be placed beyond any possible hope of succour. The losses subsequently suffered by the American fleet at Pearl Harbour on December 7, and the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse on December 8 radically altered the situation and gave to the Japanese, for the time being, command of the China seas. The possibility of early relief or evacuation of Hong Kong by sea disappeared.
But these events of December cannot, of course, invalidate the grounds of the decision of the Canadian Government in September to accept a share of the responsibility for strengthening the garrisons of the Pacific, as Australia had accepted a share in strengthening the forces at Singapore: that the despatch to Hong Kong of a reinforcement of one or two battalions would increase the strength of the garrison out of all proportion to the numbers of the reinforce- ments; that it would have a powerful moral influence on the whole of the Far East and thereby might have a sensible effect in maintaining peace; would reassure the Chinese as to the British intention to hold Hong Kong; would give fresh evidence of the solidarity of the British Commonwealth; that to gain time was all important.
There was a good deal of discussion at the hearings touching political changes in Japan which occurred a little more than a week before the expedi- tion sailed. On October 16, Matsuoka left office and Tojo became Premier. It was known that Tojo was sympathetic with the Axis Powers and there was an impression in Ottawa that his accession to power might increase the risk of war in the Pacific. However, shortly after the Japanese cabinet change information reached Ottawa to the effect that the Japanese policy of maintain- ing peace in the Pacific was likely to be maintained. This view was confirmed on October 26, the day before the expedition sailed, in the message from Cana- dian Military Headquarters in London already quoted. These expectations were falsified by the events of December, but the messages would tend to quiet any apprehension that might have arisen. I am satisfied that nothing occurred between September 29 and October 27 that would have furnished any cogent reason for the withdrawal by Canada of the responsibility she had accepted.
Some communications between the Government of Canada and the Govern- ment of the United Kingdom were placed in my hands for my personal perusal. I am at liberty to say that there is nothing in these communications which in my opinion invalidates this view.
It was urged by Mr. Drew that the change of Government in Japan on October 16 ought to have led the Canadian Government to reconsider its decision. I am satisfied that the Canadian Government did not overlook the significance of events in Japan and that they acted under the conviction that, having regard to the situation as they were acquainted with it, there was nothing in these events which would justify a departure from the course they had decided upon. It is, moreover, apparent that the considerations which in September actuated the decision to send the expedition continued to operate with equal,
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